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Derrida and Luhmann in a Theatre of Posthumanism 
What is Posthumanism? by Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press (Posthumanities series), 2010 p/b 24.95. 
Reviewed by David Cecchetto. 
 
What is Posthumanism? begins from the observation, via Foucault, that 
“humanism is its own dogma” (xiv) in the sense that the term “human” 
always naturalizes the distinctions that constitute it. In this light, Cary 
Wolfe’s posthumanism intervenes both prior to and after humanism: on one 
hand, it is anterior in that “it names the embodiment and embeddedness of 
the human being” (xv) in biological and technical worlds; on the other hand, 
posthumanism also names a contemporary historical moment in which it is 
increasingly impossible to ignore the decentering that is worked on the 
human through “its imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and 
economic networks” (xv). In this sense, then, the endeavour that Wolfe 
shoulders in WIP is not simply to contribute to a “thematics of the 
decentering of the human” (xvi), but—more importantly—to explore “what 
thought has to become in the face of” the challenges posed by that 
decentering (xvi).  
 Wolfe undertakes this task primarily through a theoretical perspective 
that conjoins Derridean deconstruction with the second order systems theory 
of Nicholas Luhmann, a combination that positions the two theorists as 
departing from a similar position, but moving in different directions. In short, 
Wolfe argues that “while Derrida emphasizes the final undecidability of any 
signifying instance, Luhmann stresses that even so, systems must decide” 
(23). As a result, Wolfe follows Luhmann in viewing systems theory as the 
reconstruction of deconstruction. 
In many ways, this responds to a problematic raised in an earlier 
discussion between Wolfe, Luhmann, Hayles, Rasch, and Knodt.1 In that 
debate, competing constructions of posthumanism variegated along the 
meaning/possibility of objectivity and the (human) ethical imperatives that 
this might entail. WIP, to my ears, resolves this debate in the only way 
possible: rather than seeking to eradicate anthropocentrism from the 
discourses that humanism produces, the text instead articulates the 
“necessity for any discourse or critical procedure to take account of the 
constitutive (and constitutively paradoxical) nature of its own distinctions, 
forms, and procedures […] in ways that may be distinguished from the 
reflection and introspection associated with the critical subject of humanism” 
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(122). In this, WIP not only answers the question of what posthumanism is—
albeit with the full ambivalence that characterizes deconstruction—but also 
performs analyses that are fully posthumanist.  
As a result, WIP exemplifies the “Posthumanist Posthumanism” section 
of a schema that Wolfe develops in order to differentiate between texts’ 
internal disciplinary operations and external relations. The work of Žižek, for 
example, demonstrates “Posthumanist Humanism” because it is internally 
posthumanist, but remains humanist in its “continued external insistence on 
the ethical and […] ontological efficacy of the human/animal divide” (124). 
By contrast, Wolfe notes that the animal rights philosophy of Tom Regan 
exemplifies “Humanist Posthumanism,” in that it takes seriously the 
(posthumanist) compulsion to make its discipline “respond to the question of 
nonhuman animals foisted on it by changes in the discipline’s environment” 
(123-124), but its internal disciplinarity remains “humanist through and 
through.” (To be clear, Wolfe notes that the “desirability of a given position 
[in his schema] must be contextualized,” so that there is a time and place 
for each of the four possible designations that flow from [Post]Humanist 
[Post]Humanism.) 
There are, I believe, two lines of criticism that this text will encounter. 
Firstly, some may find it “too theoretical,” and be disappointed that it does 
not prescribe explicit political action. Certainly, there is some ground for this, 
highlighted for example by the fact that Wolfe’s cogent analysis of Koolhaus 
and Mau’s winning Tree City plan for Toronto’s Downsview Park deals, 
materially, only with the plan itself (and the debates that surrounded it). 
Specifically, Wolfe recommends the plan’s “reduction of ‘hard’ commitments 
up front” (208) for its ability to “remain responsive over time to changing 
and unanticipated demands from its surrounding environment” (208). 
However, those familiar with how the project has unfolded since the plan 
was selected in 2000 know that its implementation has produced myriad 
economic, social, political, and material paroxysms that might be read as 
precisely the problem with this (Luhmannian) “temporalization of 
complexity”: if the park’s value lies in its being Canada’s first national urban 
park, surely this designation places a premium on whatever quality “park” is 
intended to convey, not least a certain notion of creating a space for 
“nature” in the city; otherwise, why the designation? Wolfe’s reading is 
sensitive to this differentiation—and, indeed, succeeds in articulating how 
the park is “quite literally a different entity depending on the observational 
schema we use” (210)—but one can’t help but wonder what is lost in this 
perspective’s seeming foreclosure of advocacy for a simple park, in the most 
conventional sense. In response to this criticism, though, it should be noted 
that this is precisely the problematic that Wolfe’s posthumanism intensifies, 
so that this line of critique does not so much undermine WIP as endorse the 
text’s necessity.     
Secondly, there will be those who lament that WIP does not present a 
history of posthumanism as such, in the sense that it offers neither an 
account of particular contemporary technologies, nor a synthesizing 
narrative of the disciplines (namely, “Animal Studies” and “Science and 
Technology Studies”) that contextualize the position Wolfe is developing. 
Here again, though, this criticism misses the mark not because it isn’t 
reasonable, but because it falsely constrains the terms of engagement with 
the text: those familiar with Wolfe’s body of work will recognize in WIP his 
attunement to contextual differentiation, an approach that precludes in 
advance—in practice and in theory—any neat and tidy account of 
posthumanism as such.    
Indeed, this commitment is perhaps the feature that most 
recommends WIP, and in this light I would be remiss if I didn’t note the 
tremendous intellectual, scholarly, and artistic breadth that the book 
demonstrates at every turn. If I have focused here on the flexible 
construction of posthumanism that Wolfe constatively advocates, then, this 
is not to neglect the performative dimension of the text: in some respects, it 
is precisely when the text is least focused on explaining, contextualizing, and 
refining what posthumanism “is” that the most life is breathed into 
posthumanism’s materiality/semiotics (to borrow Haraway’s conflation). To 
this end, the second half of the book—which features a huge range of artistic 
analyses that include startlingly original readings of Brian Eno and David 
Byrne’s My Life as a Bush of Ghosts and Lars von Trier’s Dancer in the 
Dark—performs instances of posthumanism that are all the more lively for 
the fact that they do not easily collect into a clear notion of posthumanism 
per se. That is, Wolfe resists the temptation to reify his variegated, localized, 
and always-already paradoxical posthumanist perspective into a theory of 
Posthumanism (uppercase P). As a result, the text relinquishes an authority 
that would make it more readily digestable, but in so doing takes on a 
parasitic quality that might—given the right hosting conditions—allow it to 
move in rhythms and patterns that its hosts’ (that is, its readers’) inherited 
humanist presumptions can neither anticipate nor contain.   
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